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Recent Development
The Right to Counsel: Its Application and Interpretation
During a Criminal Tax Fraud Investigation
In United States v. Dickerson1 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the Miranda warnings2 are constitutionally required during the
initial stage of a criminal tax fraud investigation even though, at this stage,
the suspect taxpayer is not taken into physical custody., As a result of the
Seventh Circuit's "new implementation of the Miranda policy," 4 the federal
circuits are presently split upon the question of Miranda's application to the
noncustodial interviews of a tax fraud investigation. This article will dis-
1. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
2. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court outlined the
safeguards to be followed during the interrogation of criminal suspects. The Court
stated:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either re-
tained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no question-
ing. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some state-
ments on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned.
Id. at 444-45. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Supreme Court de-
termined that the constitutional right to counsel extends to pre-trial investigation when
such "investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect...." Id. at 490. Since the Miranda and Escobedo
decisions, numerous articles have been written concerning the application of these two
cases to criminal tax fraud investigations. See, e.g., Balter, Defending Federal Tax
Evasion Cases, 13 AM. JUR. TRIALs 1 (1967); Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Crimi-
nal Tax Investigations, 53 A.B.A.J. 517 (1967); Note, The Constitutional Right to
Counsel in Tax Investigations, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 134 (1965).
3. Although in Miranda the Court stressed the inherent pressures upon a criminal
suspect during a custodial interrogation, the opinion also placed equal emphasis on the
need for a showing of "real understanding and intelligent exercise of" constitutional
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 469. This part of the opinion provides the
basis for Miranda's application to noncustodial tax fraud investigations since the ordi-
nary tax fraud investigation "is complete long before indictment and custody arises."
Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Escobedo and
Miranda: The "Critical Stage", 53 IowA L. REv. 1074, 1081 n.28 (1968).
4. United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d at 1117.
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cuss the Dickerson court's extension of the right to counsel during this
initial noncustodial stage. The implications of the Dickerson decision will
be examined in light of United States v. Tarlowski5 to determine whether an
interpretation of the term "counsel" in this context warrants the inclusion
of the services of an accountant as well as an attorney.0
Miranda's Constitutional Application
In Dickerson the court specifically delineated the initial stage of a tax
fraud investigation as the critical point7 when either revenue or special agents
of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 8 must advise the suspect taxpayer of
his constitutional right to counsel. The court stated that the
Miranda warnings must be given to the taxpayer by either the
revenue agent or the special agent at the inception of the first
5. 305 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
6. "In everyday usage, the businessman or individual taxpayer thinks of his tax ad-
visor as being either his accountant or lawyer, or perhaps both . . . . [F]or most
practical purposes, the role of the [tax] advisor is played by the lawyer and the ac-
countant ...... Miller, The Taxpayer and His Advisor-Current Problems, N.Y.U.
19th INST. ON FED. TAx. 1459 (1961). The services performed by accountants and
attorneys as tax advisors are quite similar and have resulted in a long dispute between
these two professions concerning the proper area of activity for each profession.
Aland, Relations Between Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants in Federal Tax
Practice, 15 ALA. L. REV. 517 (1963); Anderson, The Tax Practice Controversy in
Historical Perspective, 1 WM. & MARY L. REV. 18 (1957). Although presently both
professions are relied upon for tax assistance and protection, the line of demarca-
tion between the scope of the tax services which can be legitimately performed by the
two professions is not a clear one.
7. For a complete discussion of both the critical stage doctrine generally and its
specific application to a tax fraud investigation see Andrews, supra note 3, at 1109-16.
8. An Internal Revenue Agent of the Field Audit Division (revenue agent) is
charged with the responsibility of examining taxpayers' returns and supporting docu-
ments for the purpose of determining the correct tax liability. It is the duty of a
Special Agent of the Intelligence Division of the IRS (special agent) to enforce the
criminal statutes under the Internal. Revenue Code. Revenue agents undertake routine
civil audits in an attempt to ascertain if, in fact, there has been any deficiency on the
taxpayer's returns. At the start of such an audit no evidence or indication of any
fraud presumably is known to the revenue agent. If the revenue agent discovers pos-
sible fraud, he is required to suspend his examination and refer the matter to the
Intelligence Division. Barnett, Procedures in Tax Fraud Investigations, 47 TAXES 807,
810 (1969). If the Intelligence Division decides to commence a criminal investigation,
a special agent is then assigned to the case. The special agent is a trained criminal
investigator whose sole function is to determine whether the taxpayer has, in fact, vio-
lated any criminal statutes under the Internal Revenue Code. Such violations can result
in heavy fines and long prison terms for the taxpayer. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§§ 7201, 7203, 7206. It is important to recognize the substantive distinction between
these two types of agents. Thus, while a revenue agent audits the taxpayer's return to
determine civil liability, the special agent's only function is to accumulate sufficient
evidence so that a criminal prosecution may be successfully brought by the Govern-
ment. See Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant
View of A Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 34-35 (1966); Hewitt, The Constitu-
tional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES 660, 661-62 (1966).
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contact with the taxpayer after the case has been transferred to the
Intelligence Division. We have reached this conclusion on the
basis of our examination of the circumstances surrounding crimi-
nal tax investigations generally, and we find that the objective cir-
cumstances of such confrontations with government authority war-
rant the above warnings without regard to the individual tax-
payer's subjective state of mind.9
The court "recognize[d] the factual limitations of the precise holding in
Miranda"'10 but refused to sustain the Government's argument that physical
custody is the sole criterion used to determine whether Miranda applies to the
initial noncustodial stage. By rejecting physical custody as the proper test,
the court realized that "[the concept of custody is foreign to the normal
criminal tax investigation apparently because neither flight of the suspect
nor further criminal conduct is expected to occur and the crime itself is of a
non-violent nature."" No other circuit court of appeals, on being presented
with this question, has displayed an equivalent understanding of the nature
of a tax fraud investigation.' 2 These courts have consistently held that Mi-
9. United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d at 1116-17. Prior to Escobedo and
Miranda, a taxpayer under a tax fraud investigation was not entitled to any advice
from a special agent other than a proper identification. If the special agent, there-
fore, told the taxpayer his name and title, he was free to solicit incriminatory state-
ments and documents from the taxpayer. See, e.g., United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d
941 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965); United States v. Sclafani, 265
F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959); United States v. Achilli, 234
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 373 (1957).
10. United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d at 1113.
11. Andrews, supra note 3, at 1085 n.56. The Supreme Court in Mathis v. United
States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) announced that the Miranda warnings were applicable to
IRS investigations. In Mathis a revenue agent conducting a civil audit interviewed the
taxpayer twice at a Florida state penitentiary where he was serving a sentence for an
unrelated offense. During these interviews he identified certain tax returns and
signatures as his without being advised of the Miranda warnings. In reversing the
conviction for knowingly filing false claims for tax refunds, the Court did not decide
whether the Miranda safeguards should be extended to noncustodial situations; but
rather held that Mathis was in custody regardless of the circumstances which brought
about his confinement. This decision concerned a custodial tax situation rather than a
noncustodial one. For a discussion of the Mathis decision and its implications see
Lipton, Supreme Court's decision in Mathis likely to have very limited effect, 29 J.
TAX. 32 (1968).
12. See cases cited in White v. United States, 395 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968) and in Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34, 37-38 n.7
(8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969). For the most part, the opinions
of these cases disclose little true understanding of the nature of the investigative
process in tax fraud situations. Of these opinions the court in United States v. Maius,
378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905 (1967), although reluctantly
upholding evidence obtained from the taxpayer who was not fully advised of the
Miranda warnings, stressed that fairness would demand that the full warnings be given
to the taxpayer before any questioning is attempted. The court stated that "[n]o one
would believe ... that a man would appear before government agents, and answer
their questions, if he knew that the effect of his answers would be to send him
straight to the penitentiary." Id. at 719. Although following precedent until "superior
[Vol. XIX:540
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randa does not constitutionally require either a revenue or special agent to
advise a suspect taxpayer of his right to counsel after the revenue agent's
referral to the Intelligence Division"s and prior to noncustodial interviews
or interrogations.
The Dickerson rationale14 is based on an enlightened view of the exact cir-
cumstances surrounding a tax fraud investigation. In reaching its conclu-
sion the court displayed a practical knowledge of the IRS operational pro-
cedures, investigative practices, and the dire consequences to the taxpayer
who cooperates with IRS special agents. The average taxpayer doesn't know
that he can refuse to produce his records to the IRS agents.", Consequently
he cooperates, hoping to benefit his situation.' 6 The pressures on the sus-
pect taxpayer to cooperate with the IRS agents are considerable:
First, there is always the fear of incurring a civil tax liability that
hopefully might be avoided by cooperation. Also, a taxpayer may
conclude that lack of cooperation will result in unwanted publicity
about a tax liability. The average citizen, moreover, believes that
the government prosecutes only the recalcitrant, uncooperative in-
dividual who is unwilling to pay what he owes. Who would be-
lieve the ironic truth that the cooperative taxpayer fares much
worse than the individual who relies upon his constitutional
rights!'
7
One commentator has stated that a taxpayer's cooperation "will neither cause
the [special agent] to suspend his investigation . . . nor cause him to make
a recommendation against prosecution."' s In fact, few investigators can ac-
authority" dictated otherwise, the court realized that "there are few [taxpayers] who
have the toughness of fibre and the technical knowledge of their rights" to refuse to
answer the agent's questions. Id.
13. "The jurisdiction of the Intelligence Division is limited to criminal investiga-
tions." United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d at 1112-13.
14. The facts in Dickerson were that a revenue agent, who had previously discovered
that a large payment was made to the defendant, began his audit of the defendant in
July, 1964. At this time the defendant admitted that he had failed to file income tax
returns for 1960-1962. Late in 1964, the revenue agent referred the case to his su-
periors to be transferred to the Intelligence Division for possible criminal investigation.
In January, 1965, a special agent was assigned to the case. Both the special and
revenue agents visited the taxpayer at his place of business on March 24, 1965. The
special agent identified himself but did not advise the taxpayer of his constitutional
rights, including the right to counsel. From these facts the court affirmed the lower
courts decision, United States v. Dickerson, 291 F. Supp. 633 (N.D. Il1. 1968), which
suppressed the evidence obtained by the special agent during this investigation.
15. "Indeed, most lawyers, and some members of the judiciary, are not fully cog-
nizant of the taxpayer's right to withhold his records." Lipton, Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323, 332 (1968).
16. "Basically, special agents are told to take full advantage of the elements of sur-
prise and the familiar surroundings of the taxpayer's home or office. The agents
are instructed to elicit admissions and to obtain access to records before the taxpayer
has an opportunity to think about his dilemma or to consult counsel." Id. at 337.
17. Id. at 336.
18. Barnett, Procedures in Tax Fraud Investigations, 47 Tmxms 807, 814 (1969).
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cumulate sufficient evidence to warrant a successful prosecution without some
aid from the taxpayer or his records. Consequently, any cooperation with an
IRS special agent "may [well] provide the very key with which the jail door
is locked on the taxpayer."'19 Realizing the pressures to cooperate as well
as the supect taxpayer's inability to distinguish between the duties of the
revenue and special agents, 20 the Dickerson holding affords the taxpayer
under investigation the needed protection at the earliest point, when the in-
vestigation becomes criminal in nature.2 1  Revenue or special agents must
warn the taxpayer of his right to counsel at the critical, initial contact. This
procedure prevents a revenue agent from continuing his civil audit between
the time of referral to the Intelligence Division and the appearance of the
special agent into the case. Such a holding solves the practical problem left
open by the few district court cases which have already decided that Miranda
applies to noncustodial tax fraud investigations. 22  But in so holding, the
court leaves a very practical problem unresolved. This unresolved problem
was stated in United States v. Caiello :23
[T]he Dickerson holding would permit a revenue agent to testify
about statements made or records produced by the taxpayer dur-
19. Id. The author concludes that "A primary rule is: when in doubt, do not
cooperate. This means do not provide answers to the [special] agent's questions ...
and do not permit examination or copying of any personal records of the taxpayer." Id.
20. "The average taxpayer does not know the difference between a special agent
and a revenue agent, and he is not made aware of the difference by any statement or
warning that is adequate to the purpose." Lipton, supra note 15, at 337.
21. When does a criminal tax investigation reach the accusatory stage or become
criminally oriented despite the absence of physical custody? United States v. Turzyn-
ski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967) is recognized as the leading case, prior to
Dickerson, for the proposition that the accusatory stage of a criminal tax investigation
is reached at the time of the revenue agent's referral to the Intelligence Division.
Relying on Escobedo and Miranda the court held that:
once a taxpayer becomes the subject of a criminal tax investigation, as evi-
denced by the referral of the investigation to the Intelligence Division or
otherwise, our adversary process of criminal justice has become directed
against him as a potential criminal defendant. Any evidence obtained from
him is admissible only if the taxpayer furnished it after knowingly and vol-
untarily waiving his constitutional rights and privileges.
Id. at 850.
22. See cases cited in United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d at 1114 n.6. The
practical problem that the revenue agent would continue his routine audit after his
referral without giving the Miranda warnings to the taxpayer was resolved by the
holding in Dickerson. Prior to Dickerson such warnings would not be required by
the revenue agent since:
the law distinguishes between failure on the part of a government investiga-
tor to disclose the purpose of his investigation at its inception when suspicion
of criminal wrongdoing exists [special agent's functions] and the discovery of
criminal wrongdoing in the course of a routine investigation [revenue agent's
function].
United States v. Wheeler, 149 F. Supp. 445, 450 (W.D. Pa. 1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 256 F.2d 745 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
23. 420 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1969).
[Vol. XIX: 540
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ing the process of audit prior to referral to the Intelligence Divi-
sion, even though no warnings were given. Thus, the thrust of the
decision could be avoided by simply expanding the scope of the
pre-referral audit, since both revenue agents and the special
agents of the Intelligence Division peruse essentially the same
records and made essentially the same calculations. 24
Although the court in Caiello recognized that revenue and special agents do
essentially the same type of audit, it failed to distinguish between the reasons
for their investigations. This court felt it unnecessary to distinguish between
the duties of these two agents, apparently believing that any such distinction
would be formal rather than substantial. In effect, the court failed to com-
prehend the substantive distinction between these two agents.
25
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Habig,26 a companion case of
Dickerson, recognized the possibility of abuse by revenue agents who delay
their referral to the Intelligence Division until' sufficient evidence has been
accumulated to bring a criminal prosecution. The court stated that "[w]e
have no occasion in this case to consider the possible abuse of our holding
in Dickerson by [the revenue agent] unreasonably delaying the initial refer-
ence to the Intelligence Division in order to avoid the effect of the [Miranda]
warnings which are required after such a reference is made. '' 27 Therefore,
the Seventh Circuit recognizes that a revenue agent conducting a civil audit
may, after he first suspects tax fraud, rather than referring the case to the
Intelligence Division, investigate so extensively and thoroughly into the fraud
aspects that his investigation generates sufficient evidence to sustain a crimi-
nal prosecution. When the special agent later advises the taxpayer of the
Miranda warnings, such warnings are no more than a mere formality since
the IRS has already accumulated sufficient evidence from the revenue agent's
investigation to warrant a successful prosecution. If such a case were pre-
sented to the Seventh Circuit, based on the rationale in Dickerson, it should
find that since the revenue agent was performing, in fact, the functions of
the special agent without giving the necessary Miranda warnings, that the
taxpayers' constitutional rights had been violated.
Judge Cummings, who wrote for the majority in Dickerson, was impressed
by the fact that the average taxpayer often misapprehends the nature and
consequences of a tax fraud investigation and unknowingly cooperates to his
detriment in the mistaken belief that when this unpaid tax liability has been
determined and paid the IRS agents will be satisfied. Mindful of the fact
24. Id. at 472 n.2.
25. See note 8 supra for the substantive distinction between revenue and special
agents.
26. 413 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1969).
27. Id. at 1111 n.4.
1970]
Catholic University Law Review
of physical custody present in Miranda, the court felt, nevertheless, that it
could not accept an interpretation of Miranda that would restrict the imple-
mentation of the Supreme Court's overriding concern with the opportunity
for intelligent exercise of one's constitutional rights. The court stated that:
We understand the teaching of Miranda to be that one con-
fronted with governmental authority in an adversary situation
should be accorded the opportunity to make an intelligent deci-
sion as to the assertion or relinquishment of those constitutional
rights designed to protect him under precisely such circumstances.
No contention is made that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not protect one interrogated in a non-custodial setting, only
that one in such circumstances has no need of advice as to his
rights, or, indeed, of the pendency of a criminal investigation at
all. But custodial interrogation is merely one variety of con-
frontation. . . . The inquiry does not end with custody or its
absence.
28
Since the Dickerson decision a number of cases from other circuits have re-
jected the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit. 29  One of these post-Dickerson
rejections was United States v. Browney,30 where in a concurring opinion
Circuit Judge Sobeloff found the Dickerson rationale to be "persuasively
reasoned" and that the majority opinion in Browney should not have decided
that the Dickerson rationale be rejected in the Fourth Circuit. "While I am
aware that Dickerson is not in the mainstream of past decisions, including
some in our circuit, I nevertheless find it persuasively reasoned. At least it is
entitled to our serious consideration in a future case if and when the question
is properly before us."'" This issue, therefore, would seem to require a
28. United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d at 1114.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1970); Marcus v. United States, 422 F.2d 752 (5th
Cir. 1970); Simon v. United States, 421 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Browney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.
1969). These rejections except for the Prudden decision have been made without an
analysis of the reasoning in Dickerson. On the facts presented to the court in Prudden
their rejection of Dickerson's underlying policy seems somewhat misplaced. The court
stated that "[Wie are particularly unwilling to extend [Miranda] to an adult experienced
businessman, a law school graduate, who for over a year voluntarily furnished selected
corporate and personal records to tax agents-not claimed to be overbearing but over
kind." (emphasis added.) United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d at 1028.
30. 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 53. In distinguishing the majority's approach in Browney from the
approach used in Dickerson, he stated:
The majority correctly recognizes that the Miranda mandate to notify the
suspected taxpayer of his right to counsel is not limited to custodial situations.
It says that Miranda is not triggered when an accused is neither in custody,
nor deprived of his freedom in any significant way, nor subject to coercion or
intimidation. The position that this court takes, as I understand it, would not
confine Miranda to deprivations of physical freedom, but would include any
set of circumstances that robs a person of freedom of will or independence of
[Vol. XIX: 540
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Supreme Court interpretation of the extent to which the Miranda decision
applies to noncustodial tax situations, thus settling the present split of opinion
among the circuits.
In deciding whether the Miranda warnings are mandatory during the initial
noncustodial stage, the Supreme Court might find that a suspect taxpayer is
entitled to such warnings on the basis of present IRS procedures rather than
analyzing the constitutional mandate stated in United States v. Dickerson.3 2
Present IRS Procedures
IRS procedures require that special agents give full-scale Miranda warnings
to the suspect taxpayer at their initial noncustodial meeting.33  The IRS,
therefore, has taken upon itself the obligation of advising suspect taxpayers of
the Miranda warnings before proceeding with the tax fraud investigation, al-
though most courts have not found such procedures to be constitutionally re-
quired.3 4 In United States v. Heffner" the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that due process requires evidence obtained by a special agent during
a tax fraud investigation to be suppressed when these procedures are not
complied with. The court in reaching its conclusion used this narrow non-
constitutional approach and avoided the issue of Miranda's constitutional
application to the initial noncustodial interview. The court avoided analyz-
ing the Dickerson reasoning and reversed the defendant's conviction of tax
evasion upon the ground that "[a] n agency of the government must scrupu-
lously observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established.
When it fails to do so, its action cannot stand and courts will strike it
down."'36  The court felt such a holding was necessary "to prevent the ar-
bitrariness which is inherently characteristic of an agency's violation of its
own procedures."37
The effect of the Heffner decision, i.e., that "[i] t is of no significance
that the procedures or instructions which the IRS has established are more
generous than the Constitution requires,"' 38 will be to negate the Government's
judgment. . . However, their approach necessarily involves case-by-case
adjudication, and the Seventh Circuit, [in Dickerson] on the basis of its
experience in assessing confessions and admissions elicited in tax cases, has
found this technique unsatisfactory.
Id. at 52.
32. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
33. Barnett, supra note 18, at 816-17 n.20 quoting from the Internal Revenue Man-
ual § 9384.2, effective Nov. 21, 1968.
34. Andrews, supra note 3, at 1088 n.71.
35. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
36. Id. at 811.
37. Id. at 812.
38. Id.
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position that since the IRS procedures "go beyond most legal requirements
at present ... that if [a special] agent fails to follow these instructions the
IRS will argue in court that no constitutional rights were thereby violated. '3 9
If the Supreme Court adopts the Heffner reasoning, the Court would thereby
avoid the question of whether Miranda warnings are constitutionally re-
quired during the initial noncustodial interview. Unlike the Dickerson
holding, these procedures do not require the revenue agent to advise the
taxpayer of his constitutional rights after referral to the Intelligence Division.
Further, these procedures are subject to revocation by the IRS. Thus
the Miranda warnings, including the right to counsel, "should be required
by the Constitution and not merely by agency procedural rules." 40
Prior to such a decision resolving this issue, a special agent must advise
the suspect taxpayer of his right to counsel, at the initial contact, based either
on present IRS procedures or on Dickerson's constitutional application of
Miranda. The question presented, therefore, is how the term "counsel"
should be interpreted in light of United States v. Tarlowski.4'
Interpreting the Term "Counsel"
In Tarlowski a federal district court in New York reasoned that the assistance
of a tax accounting advisor is constitutionally required during the noncustodial
stage of a tax fraud investigation when such an investigation is directed at a
taxpayer who relies exclusively upon his accountant for tax assistance and
protection. 42 Tarlowski made a motion to suppress as evidence all docu-
ments and statements, oral or written, which were obtained by IRS special
agents in two noncustodial interviews during which he was denied the as-
39. Andrews, supra note 3, at 1082 n.30. The question decided in Heffner was one
of first impression. Since the Heffner decision three federal district courts have decided
this identical issue, i.e., whether evidence obtained by special agents in violation of
present IRS procedures must be suppressed. Two of these decisions, United States v.
Middletown, CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 9499 (D. Minn. June 5, 1970) and
United States v. Luna, CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 9498 (W.D. Tex. May 7,
1970), have rejected the Heffner reasoning on the basis that an administrative agency
(IRS) may not dictate preconditions for the admissability of evidence in a criminal tax
prosecution. Another district court, in United States v. Leahy, Crim. No. 69-320-G (D.
Mass. June 2, 1970), granted the defendant's suppression motion based on the Heffner
decision. The Leahy decision has been appealed by the Government to the First Cir-
cuit in order to resolve this present conflict between the district courts.
40. Andrews, supra note 3, at 1116-17 n.242.
41. 305 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
42. Courts have curtailed accountant activity which closely resembled the attorney's
work by holding such services to have been an unauthorized practice of law. See,
e.g., Agran v. Shaperio, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954); In re Bercu, 273
App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948). Although the court in Tarlowski recog-
nized that the defendant relied upon his accounting advisors for tax assistance, this
assistance must be distinguished from that which is rendered by an attorney.
[Vol. XIX:540
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sistance and counsel of his accounting advisors. Based on the evidence
gathered by these agents, the Government prosecuted Tarlowski for the willful
failure to file his income tax returns for the calender years 1963-1965. 43
The district court granted the defendant's suppression motion on the ground
that these special agents denied the defendant "due process" by interfering,
without clear authority, with his ability "to consult with, and be accompanied
by, a person upon whom he relies for [tax] advice and protection . . .-.
The court held that this denial of accounting assistance violated due process
even though the special agent had advised Tarlowski of his right to counsel.
Although the court did not specifically analyze the meaning of the right to
counsel, it did recognize that in this context the right to counsel should be
interpreted as a practical concept to include the services of an accountant as
well as an attorney. If such an interpretation of the right to counsel is
warranted, Tarlowski was denied not only due process but also his right to
counsel.
The Tarlowski decision placed great emphasis upon the defendant's exclu-
sive reliance upon his accounting advisors. This reliance factor would ap-
pear to be a prerequisite for constitutionally requiring the allowance of serv-
ices of an accountant. A summary of the facts and the reasoning in Tarlow-
ski is necessary to appreciate the need for a construction of the term counsel
which does not exclude the services of an accounting advisor. Tarlowski
had two separate noncustodial interviews with IRS special agents. He was
allowed to seek advice from his tax accountant during neither. The first
interview took place at the home office of Tarlowski's accountant who had
arranged this meeting at the special agent's request. After requesting the
defendant's accountant to leave the interview room, the special agent advised
Tarlowski of his right to counsel and then proceeded with the questioning.
The court summarized this first interview as follows:
while he [the special agent] was informing the prospective de-
fendant of his right to counsel, he was simultaneously requesting
that the defendant's accountant leave during the interrogation. In
effect, the investigator informed Tarlowski that he might have his
attorney present, but not his accountant. 45
43. INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7203. "In order to sustain a conviction for failure
to make a return, it is necessary for the Government to establish three things: (1)
That the defendant was a person required by law to make a return for the taxable
period; (2) That he failed to make a return at the time required by law; and (3) That
the failure to make a return was willful." Government's Trial Memorandum at 2,
United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). As a practical matter
no prosecution will be normally initiated unless a tax liability is actually owed.
44. United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F. Supp. at 124. Judge Weinstein further stated
that such interference by federal representatives during a criminal tax fraud investiga-
tion violated the "specific command of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law". Id. at 116.
45. Id. at 115.
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The second interview took place at the defendant's home, specifically, in the
driveway outside his home.46  When the defendant requested the presence
of his accounting advisors, the special agent denied this request on the
ground that the right to counsel only means the right to an attorney not
the right to an accountant. The court summarized its conclusions as to this
second meeting:
Again, in effect by proceeding when the defendant had expressed
his desire to consult with his accountant, the Special Agent denied
him the right to the assistance of anyone other than his attorney.
Although Tarlowski had specifically expressed his intention to
seek advice, the agent informed him of his rights . . . and
[then] proceeded with his inquiries, thereby conveying the im-
pression that the right to seek advice was not available except
through an attorney. 47
Thus it appears that the special agent believed what is presumably the IRS's
"official position," i.e., that while conducting a tax fraud investigation the
suspect's right to counsel does not include the advice of anyone other than an
attorney.48  Tarlowski's tax accountant was an indispensable advisor49 and,
46. The special agent again met Tarlowski in order to secure copies of his work-
sheets and ledger books which were in the defendant's possession. Tarlowski volun-
tarily gave these records to the special agent and they were used as a basis for his
prosecution. Since the special agent obtained these records from the suspect without
the use of a summons, INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7602, any fifth amendment rights of
the defendant were apparently waived. Courts have uniformly concluded that the ac-
counting workpapers pertaining to the taxpayer's tax returns or to his financial affairs
constitute incriminating evidence. The confrontation between an IRS summons de-
manding the accountant's workpapers and the asserted privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has been presented to many courts with varying results. For a general discussion
see Barney, The Protection of Documents in Criminal Tax Fraud Cases, 44 TAXES
626 (1966); Burroughs, The Use of the Administrative Summons in Federal Tax In-
vestigations, 9 VILL. L. REV. 371 (1964); Cohen, Accountants' Workpapers in Federal
Tax Investigations, 21 TAX L. REV. 183 (1966). Tarlowski's accountant delivered his
workpapers to the defendant with the intent of relinquishing all ownership interest in
the documents. If Tarlowski, therefore, had refused to give the special agent these rec-
ords, which were now in his rightful possession, the court apparently upon a timely
assertion by Tarlowski could find that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination would apply, and that the resulting protection would necessarily follow.
See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) (taxpayer in possession of
cancelled checks and other documents may properly refuse to disclose them to the
I.R.S. These documents are protected by the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination). In United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967), the court
believed that the possession of the accountant's workpapers by the taxpayer, even if the
possession had been wrongfully obtained, did not bar the fifth amendment privilege.
47. United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F. Supp. at 115.
48. The earnings to be given by the special agent are specifically worded to advise
the suspect that he may "seek the assistance of an attorney before responding" to any
questions. Barnett, supra note 18, at 816-17 n.20 quoting from the Internal Reve-
nue Manual § 9384.2, effective Nov. 21, 1968.
49. The tax services rendered by the accountant as a tax advisor "includes planning
business operations in order to minimize the impact of taxes, as well as the computa-
tion of taxable income and preparation of tax returns." W. B. MEIGS & C.E. JOHNSON,
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consequently, the court felt that due process required that his assistance not
be denied at this initial noncustodial stage. The court expressly recognized
that Tarlowski "was denied the full assistance of his accountant when such
assistance would have been most helpful to him in awakening him to his
danger of prosecution." 50
Presented with these facts the court decided the case on the basis of whether
or not "a representative [of the federal government], contemplating a crimi-
nal prosecution, [may] demand the presence of an individual for question-
ig, but at the same time, refuse that person the right to be accompanied by
another in whom he reposes trust and confidence." 5' 1 To answer this ques-
tion, the court asked whether any authority, permitting or sanctioning this
denial of accounting assistance, was "clearly specified in a statute or plainly
implied from constitutional or recognized common law sources. 512  Employ-
ing a two-step analysis, the court ultimately found no statutory authorization
for this governmental denial of accounting assistance. First, the court ex-
plored the fundamental liberties not expressly enumerated in the Constitution
but guaranteed by the requirement of due process. 53  Second, the court at-
tempted to define the scope of these implicit rights in relationship to a govern-
mental denial of needed accounting services during a tax fraud investiga-
tion. 54 Based on this balancing analysis the court found that the due process
guarantee had been violated by these government agents, since they had in-
fringed upon Tarlowski's right to freely consult with his professional tax
accounting advisors, while he was under investigation.
In concluding that the Miranda warnings cannot be given by a special
agent in a formalistic manner, the court recognized that Tarlowski's account-
ant was relied upon as counsel. The court stated that "[flor a government of-
ACCOUNTING: THE BASIS FOR BUSINEss DECISIONs 5 (1962). To render effective
assistance the accountant, therefore, must have a thorough understanding of the finan-
cial and economic needs of the business as well as being familiar with the tax stat-
utes, administrative regulations, and court decisions.
50. United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F. Supp. at 124.
51. Id. at 116.
52. Id. at 122.
53. The Supreme Court has recognized such implicit rights in a variety of fact
situations. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy in intimate marital relation-
ship); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (right to travel); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (right to conduct and attend private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach and learn foreign languages).
54. To determine the scope of these implicit rights guaranteed by due process, the
court used three standards of interpretation of the fifth amendment. These standards
are (1) the common and statutory law of England and the laws of the various states
at the time of the Bill of Rights, (2) the interpretation of the entire Bill of Rights and
(3) the intent of the framers of the Constitution. United States v. Tarlowski, 305
F. Supp. at 116.
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ficial to mouth in a ritualistic way part of the warning about the right to
counsel while excluding the person relied upon as counsel, is, in effect, to
reverse the meaning of the words used."' 55 If read literally, this statement
means that the federal agents' denial of needed accounting assistance was a
denial of Tarlowski's right to counsel. Such a reading must be prefaced by
realizing that this court felt it was necessary to interpret "counsel" broadly,
to mean "one who advises."
At first, this broad interpretation would appear to be a strictly subjective
standard to use in determining a suspect's counsel. However, many tax-
payers rely upon the accounting profession for tax assistance, and this reality
should dictate a workable objective standard to be applied to such tax-
payers. The court stated that this reality
is reinforced by a consideration of the functions of accountants
retained by people seeking aid in their relationship with tax col-
lectors. To many laymen like the defendant, an accountant is re-
lied upon for legal advice and protection. Suits involving unau-
thorized practice of law and claimed accountant-client privileges
as well as the policies of the IRS itself are indicia of this de-
pendence. 56
Attorneys representing taxpayers during a fraud investigation will similarly
rely upon the skill and knowledge of the taxpayer's accounting advisors
because "[a]ccounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers in
almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases."157  The attorney,
therefore, to effectively represent the taxpayer will refer to his client's ac-
counting advisors to understand and comprehend the accounting procedures
employed by his client.58 Recognizing the present reality of reliance upon the
55. Id. at 124.
56. Id. at 123-24. Many states have statutes establishing the confidentiality of com-
munications between client and accountant. For a listing of these states see Note,
Privileged Communications-Accountants and Accounting-A Critical Analysis of Ac-
countant--Client Privilege Statutes, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1264-66 n.2 (1968). By such
statutes an accountant is prohibited by state law from voluntarily divulging communica-
tions from his client or workpapers prepared from such communication. Although
these state statutes are not recognized in federal tax investigations or prosecutions,
through the use of the attorney-client privilege, see Holzman, How Far Does the Ac-
countant-Taxpayer Privilege Really Extend, 45 TAXES 654, 658 (1967), the maximum
protection of the taxpayer under investigation is available only by the close cooperation
between these two tax advisors. "The basic theory is that the accountant's assistance
is necessary to the adequate rendering of legal services and therefore the accountant
is, in effect, an extension of the attorney in his work on the case." Garbis & Burke,
Fifth Amendment Protection of the Accountant's Workpapers in Tax Fraud Investiga-
tions, 47 TAXES 12, 20 (1969).
57. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
58. Garbis & Burke, supra note 56, at 23. The authors of this article conclude that
the complex problems concerning the possible protection for the accounting workpapers
during a criminal tax fraud investigation are representative of the many problems ini-
tially facing the taxpayer under investigations. The authors realize that to insure
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accounting profession for tax assistance and the broad interpretation given to
counsel based on such reliance, the Tarlowski court's approach might well pro-
vide the basis for determining whether a denial of accounting assistance
during the initial noncustodial stage violates the suspect taxpayer's right to
counsel.
Prior to the Tarlowski decision "[i]t [was] hornbrook criminal tax law
that the taxpayer [under criminal investigation] is constitutionally entitled
to be represented by counsel, but it [was] equally well established that
there [was] no equivalent constitutional right to the services of an account-
ant."59 Courts have recognized the need for accounting as well as legal serv-
ices to insure that a defendant is afforded effective counsel in the prepara-
tion and trial of a tax prosecution. In United States v. Brodson,60 it was held
that "[w] ithout the assistance of an accountant the defendant is denied [the]
effective assistance of counsel."61 Based on this rationale the court granted
Brodson's pre-trial motion to dismiss the Government's indictment for filing
false and fraudulent income tax returns. The decision was based on the
Government's denial to the defendant of needed accounting services at a
criminal prosecution, 62 while in Tarlowski the Government's denial of
needed accounting services occurred during a criminal investigation. If the
taxpayer's right to effective counsel during a criminal prosecution demands
the close cooperation of both accounting and legal services, such combined
services should likewise be afforded the taxpayer during a tax investiga-
tion since such an investigation will normally produce the evidence needed to
sustain a criminal prosecution. On appeal, with two judges dissenting, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Apoeals reversed the district court's decision to dis-
miss the action without passing upon the critical question of whether account-
ing services are necessary to insure the defendant's right to effective coun-
sel. Their reversal was founded solely on the rationale that it was not possi-
ble for a court to decide in advance of the trial that a defendant could not or
would not receive effective counsel to insure a fair trial.63 The court
the effective representation of the taxpayer the close cooperation of both accounting
and legal professions is necessary at the initial stage of a tax fraud investigation.
59. Miller, The Taxpayer and His Advisor-Current Problems, N.Y.U. 19TH INST.
ON Fa. TAX. 1459, 1462 (1961).
60. 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 241 F.2d 107 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
61. Id. at 164.
62. The needed services of an accountant were denied the defendant when the Gov-
ernment levied a jeopardy assessment and tax liens upon his property in October
1951, thereby freezing the defendant's use of his assets. Id. at 158.
63. United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 111 (7th Cir. 1957). The court rea-
soned that it "should not on a pretrial motion prematurely decide the constitutional
questions [of effective counsel] raised by the defendant." Id. at 110. Therefore, the
court concluded that the "only question before us at this time is that of the propriety
of the [dismissal] order of the district court . I..." d. at 111.
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stated:
Whether . . . the constitution requires that one indicted for
income tax evasion is entitled to the services of an accountant to
assist his attorney . . . we do not now decide. However, we
think it is obvious that there is no such requirement invariably and
as a matter of law in every such case. If there is such a constitu-
tional requirement at all, a defendant's right to invoke it must
depend upon the particular circumstances of his case.6 4
Although the majority in Brodson recognized the possibility that the right
to counsel may constitutionally require the services of an accountant, it was
not willing to dismiss a criminal indictment on a pre-trial motion, thereby
barring the Government's opportunity to present its case in court. The
court stated:
It is not sound policy for a district court to summarily dispose
of an indictment and free a person charged with crime by re-
solving a question of fact without the taking of evidence, par-
ticularly where the fact relates to a future event.65
Former Chief Judge Duffy vigorously dissented on the ground that the de-
fendant had been denied both due process and effective counsel. He urged
that the Government's denial of accounting services deprived the defendant
of the effective assistance of counsel and stated that "[t]he tactics of the
Government in this case in preventing the defendant from utilizing the nec-
essary tools of defense certainly offends my sense of justice. There were no
elements of fairness present in the Government's tactics." 66  Circuit Judge
Finnegan likewise dissented on the basis that the advice and assistance of an
accountant was necessary in order to insure the defendant's right to effective
counsel. This conclusion, that effective counsel demands accounting as
well as legal assistance, was based on an interpretation of the right to coun-
sel "in the context of modem society. '67  Although the facts of Brodson
raise a particular problem of effective counsel,68 this decision serves as an
analogy in determining whether the right to counsel is violated by denying
the suspect taxpayer the assistance of his accounting advisors during a tax
64. Id. at 109-110.
65. Id. at 110.
66. Id. at 111. (dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 113. (dissenting opinion).
68. The rationale of the district court was found persuasive in United States v.
Allied Stevedoring Corp., 138 F. Supp. 555, 557-58 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), but the court
determined that the decision was not applicable to the fact situation before it. The
Brodson reasoning has had a limited scope since the case concerned a net worth
prosecution. For an understanding of a net worth prosecution and the problems in-
volved see Baiter, A Ten Year Review of Fraud Prosecutions, N.Y.U. 19"H INST. ON
FED. TAX. 1125, 1141-47 (1961). The Government's use of this method of proving tax
evasion is quite limited because of the extreme difficulties of accumulating sufficient
evidence for a successful prosecution.
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fraud investigation. The Brodson holding did not preclude the possibility that
the services of an accountant are constitutionally required in all circum-
stances. The Tarlowski court found that such circumstances do exist in the
context of a tax fraud investigation. That Tarlowski was denied the as-
sistance of counsel is a conclusion based on the realization that he was not
allowed to freely consult with those professional tax advisors "relied upon as
counsel."6 9
Conclusion
The Dickerson and Tarlowski decisions reflect the current trend of courts to
insure the suspect taxpayer effective representation at the initial noncustodial
stage. By holding that the services of an accountant as well as an attorney
are constitutionally required, these two cases display the appropriate un-
derstanding of the unique nature of a tax fraud investigation, compared to the
operational process of other criminal investigations. This understanding is
necessary to determine that a suspect taxpayer is entitled to the same con-
stitutional safeguards afforded other criminal suspects. Judge Will appro-
priately stated in United States v. Turzynski70 that the effect of failing to
understand the unique nature of a tax fraud investigation will
lead to the anomalous conclusion that a person suspected of
bank robbery, sale of narcotics, murder, rape or other serious
crime is entitled to greater protection of his constitutional rights
than a person suspected of violating the internal revenue laws.
For when the silent transition from civil to criminal investigation
takes place in a tax case, the taxpayer being interrogated and
asked to furnish his books and records is just as surely a prime
suspect and candidate for criminal prosecution as the individual
under interrogation as a suspect for other crimes. 71
69. United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F. Supp. at 124.
70. 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. I1. 1967).
71. Id. at 850-51.
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